Unlike Quine, Murray Clarke is defending a weak replacement thesis of naturalized epistemology. Clarke argues that accurate indexical representations (a belief about the here and now which moves us to action) have been crucial for the survival and reproduction of homo sapiens. He suggests that reliable processes have been “selected for” because of their indirect, […]
Carnap wants to diminish bad metaphysics influence, so he rejects metaphysical terms which are meaningless and non-verifiable. Metaphysical beliefs are derived neither by logic nor by empirical evidences: Aesthetics – this painting is better than.. Ethics – X ought to do Y, Religion – God exists. These propositions are meaningless as they are non-verifiable. According […]
Quine argues that the position of the dominant epistemology has failed and we need to reconstruct the traditional view in another way. We should replace epistemology with psychology, because epistemology is asking wrong questions. Instead of “How ought we to arrive at our beliefs?”, the main question should be “How do we arrive at our […]
Goldman is an externalist and a foundationalist who thinks that it is possible to have justified belief even if there is not reason to believe that it is true. If it is a matter of fact that our visual perception is reliable, then our beliefs might be justified. Visual perception is reliable when conditions are […]