The disappearance of any normative idea of ​​art since the era of conceptual art has opened up unlimited possibilities and total freedom of contemporary art. The whole problem is to know by virtue of what to judge a work under the denunciation of any notion of quality. How to appreciate the art of “anything”? Critics of contemporary art often find themselves in the negation of art manifested today by the public’s rejection of works such as that of Paul McCarthy, the creator of Tree, vandalized just after its installation (1). Uneasiness is also increased in the face of the impasse echoed by theories such as that of Arthur Danto who observes “…that with Brillo’s boxes, all the possibilities of art have been realized, and that therefore, in a way, the history of art is finished” (2).
As part of the solutions that would allow us to get out of this impasse, we could return to the categories of classical aesthetics to transform them further. It is not a question of reducing art in the name of an interpretation of Kant or Hume. It is a question of relying on classical theories to, firstly, formulate the rupture of contemporary art with traditional art and, secondly, to designate in what sense to redefine the evaluation of contemporary works. We must therefore reflect on how the four essential positions of aesthetic judgment in Kant agree with contemporary works of art. Furthermore, we need to clarify whether an empirical analysis of Hume’s rule of taste applies to contemporary works of art.
Resorting to an analytical philosophy also appears to be a salutary step. The first trend that interests us is characterized by the radical distinction between aesthetic meanings and non-aesthetic meanings. It is not about thinking about what is beautiful, but about what we say about beauty. How do aesthetic statements work? The same conceptual demand is presented in Sibley’s works, which can be useful for the explanatory aspect of the fracture of contemporary aesthetic experience. Although the analytic aesthetic of this period has become “…a pure celebration of the impotence of the status quo” (3), it is an important part of clarifying what makes our aesthetic appreciation confused in front of a work of contemporary art.
The second trend in analytical aesthetics that developed from the 1960s is what is called the ontology of art. It is a reflection on aesthetic statements in terms of the definition of art. The great presenter of this movement is Nelson Goodman, who shows that the question “What is art?” makes no sense, and that it must be replaced by other question “When is there art?” (4). It is the artistic intention that is decisive. According to Rainer Rochlitz, theories like that of Nelson Goodman denounce any notion of the quality of art since their definition of art does not correspond to art’s essence, but to its functioning (5). The will to make a work cannot be a criterion of art, “…any more than the will to tell the truth does not guarantee the reliability of an assertion” (6). Consequently, Goodman replaces aesthetic rationality with an undifferentiated cognitive rationality that escapes the critical and appreciative dimension of art.
While Goodman’s art is a matter of symbolism, Joseph Kosuth’s art is reduced to the idea of ​​art. According to him, art is only the definition of art, that is to say dematerialized art. Kosuth is one of the representatives of the artistic movement of conceptual art in which an artwork becomes secondary. What interests us in this approach is the dematerialized dimension of the artwork which implies the artistic value of the concept or the idea of ​​​​art. If the artwork then becomes the medium or the tool of its concept, we can enter the exhibition dimension in which we judge not the artwork, but its description of the concept, namely language. This conceptual inversion not only follows the logic of exhibition but also makes it possible to find the rationality of appreciation of contemporary works, in particular of the ready-made. To justify or validate the use of aesthetic categories, it is possible to identify many more criteria in the descriptive concept than in the visual object of the ready-made. In this regard, we must obviously consider the work of Gérard Genette on the conceptual state, who observes that “the conceptual gesture is by definition reducible to its concept, but it is not up to the conceptual gesture to say why, how much, or how” ( 7). The question that arises here is whether conceptual reduction can be a universal descriptive operation that can be judged or whether it is a mental operation that everyone should perform for themselves.
An additional cause of disorientation in the evaluation of contemporary art lies in the lack of unity and homogeneity of artworks. How to unify art which very frequently provokes contrasting impressions and feelings: scandal, indifference, irritation, curiosity, astonishment, etc.? It is therefore appropriate to turn to the aesthetics of pluralism referring to the diversity, variability and relativity of aesthetic experience. This new paradigm is the challenge of Yves Michaud that I will try to deepen in the sense of the elaboration of the scales of appreciation. Michaud shows that one can think about the diversity of contemporary art without falling into pure relativism. Aesthetic judgment develops, amplifies, becomes more complex and standardized within particular and local language games (8). However, the value of an artwork is a value relative to each group which poses an authority to which the other spectators can conform. On the other hand, the particular value is objectively inscribed in a work since the specific qualities of the work “…are given to the human being in a perceptual experience that is both universal and direct” (9). The first difficulty that arises here is the following: how is it possible to orient oneself in this extreme differentiation of language games and aesthetic appreciations? Despite this diversity of artworks, Michaud emphasizes that the criteria can be applied universally to an immense variety of art objects. The hierarchies of values ​​could obey different canons such as technical success, the motivation of the artist or aesthetic immersion. My search for aesthetic rationality will therefore be based on the idea that contemporary art is made up of a plurality of specific, autonomous values, which one can judge in the network of superimposed scales of appreciation.
The question of aesthetic values ​​is well developed by Rochlitz. According to him, coherence, depth and originality are three criteria that determine the value of a work (10). Coherence is the unity of a vision, design, style, etc. The desired inconsistency is also a type of coherence when it presents a certain logic in relation to the whole. Even if this concept does not in fact designate any particular type of unity, all the elements have a relationship with what is presented as a work. Here we can admit that it is consciously difficult to distinguish between incoherence and coherent incoherence. If the intended inconsistency is selected on the basis of its expressive value, it follows that incoherence as well as coherence can meet the criterion of merit for an artwork. The second parameter presented by Rochlitz is the the depth. A work can be criticized “…because its theme is purely documentary or too heartbreaking for an artistic presentation” (11). This assertion obviously disadvantages the appreciation of artworks such as ready-made or minimalist art. We can say that Duchamp’s bottle rack is partially a failure because of the lack of depth of the artwork, but Rochlitz does not give us a choice of criteria bringing together the local scales of appreciation. Even the third criterion of originality does not cover artworks whose novelty is reduced to a minimal gesture. According to Rochlitz, such a subversive attitude “…is qualified as quasi-aesthetic, but hardly as an artwork or art” (12).
It remains to see whether it is necessary to define the artistic character of artworks in order to assess them as works of art or whether one can rely on the criteria which will determine what is art or not. For example, the happening does not need an artistic object, but it can possess certain values ​​that one can appreciate. Here, the presence of its values ​​already implies a certain artistic character since they are attributed to a work in relation to an artist who made it. Consequently, questioning the ontology of the artwork makes sense when this approach assists in aesthetic rationalization and the development of criteria for the judgment of taste.
It remains to see whether it is necessary to define the artistic character of artworks in order to assess them as works of art or whether one can rely on the criteria which will determine what is art or not. For example, the happening does not need an artistic object, but it can possess certain values ​​that one can appreciate. Here, the presence of its values ​​already implies a certain artistic character since they are attributed to a work in relation to an artist who made it. Consequently, questioning the ontology of the artwork makes sense when this approach assists in aesthetic rationalization and the development of criteria for the judgment of taste.
The argumentation developed by Rainer Rochlitz intends precisely to resolve the question of the criteria for evaluating and appreciating contemporary artworks. However, by testing the validity of these criteria, one can suspect not only the majority of contemporary artworks, but also classical artworks, devoid of all these characteristics. Marc Jimenez emphasizes that these evaluation criteria are not applicable to current practices calling into question all the usual standards of legitimation (13). Thus, the elaboration of aesthetic criteria requires a larger-scale approach in the hope of unifying aesthetic experiences of each language game. We must first determine the fields of assessment that will allow us to classify the assessment scales. The evaluation of works involves the discernment and analysis of the properties of art objects. On the one hand, these can be physical properties relating to the material and representational dimension of the art object. On the other hand, these can be non-physical qualities corresponding to the process of artistic creation, to the concept of the art object or to the effects of artistic productions on the human receiver. In the final chapter of my work, I will expose several evaluation criteria to show the perspectives of research in the field of aesthetic rationalization. Among the non-physical and physical criteria, I will analyze the appreciation of the concept of an artwork, the appreciation of the immersion and the evaluation of an artwork from the accidental character of the creation. The temptation to find rationality in the application of the aesthetic categories of conceptual art leads to an interest in judging the idea of ​​a work of art. By looking at banal installations, we are in a relationship where the important thing is not the object, but the gesture of the artist, his motivation to exhibit an object, his contemplation on the things of everyday life. The problem is that artists of pop art or conceptual art claim that an exhibition work has certain aesthetic properties while such artists have abandoned the search for essence, for beauty in their artistic creations. The installation Tree by Paul McCarthy, marked by the aggression on the artist, shows this break in the spectator’s expectation when faced with an artistic gesture. On the one hand, McCarthy perceives his “tree” as an artwork with several references, but none of which truly represents it. He admits that viewers may be offended if they refer to the butt plug, but for him this is closer to an abstraction (14). On the other hand, McCarthy calls on the public to appreciate his abstract work based on the criterion of the beauty of its form, of its particular color. One cannot without inconsistency both expose an artwork for its object properties and refer to what has nothing to do with the existence of these properties.
Another dimension of evaluation that would allow us to decipher the art of “anything” in terms of values ​​is the transgression of artistic rules. Even though visual art has become relatively pasteurized and framed, it is still possible to find audacity in the artist’s reflection on art evolving into other forms. An artwork that provokes debate has value if it establishes new standards of artistic creation within the new scale of appreciation. In this context, audacity, in the sense of the power to provoke, must be transformed into a new form of fruitful transgression. Nowadays, audacity for audacity, which is erected as a principle of contemporary artistic creation, must be devalued. It only serves the art market to promote an artist with the intention of shocking the viewer. Such is the difference between Duchamp’s Fountain, which aims to conceptually discourage aesthetic pleasure, and McCarthy’s Tree, which attempts to artificially stir up controversy.
Another value from which one can reevaluate the standards of taste is the work of the artist with randomness. There is no necessary arrangement in the methodical use of randomness in art. The artist takes a risk with a game of manipulation that is admirable in the emergence of an unpredictable and sensational form. To restore the problematic of this notion, it is necessary to insist on the following questions: in what does an aesthetic value of randomness consist in art and what degree of randomness should be the most appreciated in artistic practice? For this, the subject will revolve around the analysis of the works of Francis Bacon and Marcel Duchamp. Bacon’s artistic method is an example of manipulated randomness, namely randomness integrated into the creative process of painting. While Bacon’s randomness extracts a pictorial choice, Marcel Duchamp’s randomness joins the infinity of possibilities. Duchamp’s method is not part of Bacon’s act of painting, since Duchamp fixes probability, while Bacon transforms it.
It can be objected to the concept of aesthetic rationality that contemporary works of art, often misunderstood, provocative and confused, stem from sensitivity, from irrational faculties. However, it is not a question of rationalizing the artistic production to invent the magic formula of a successful artwork, but it is a question of the degree of success, of the importance which one grants to the work. The concept of aesthetic rationality can well identify the non-aesthetic dimensions on which we can base our judgment of taste.
Another difficulty lies in the classification of contemporary works which belong to different language games, but which are appreciated under the same scale of appreciation. If, for example, the immersive character of an artwork is considered as a criterion of judgment of taste, how can we classify the installation Ganzeld by James Turell or a conceptual work by Christian Boltanski based on this criterion? One of the solutions can be based on the union of aesthetic experiences for each value that is attributed to an artwork. In this case, immersion is seen as one of the elements to be enjoyed within the complex of aesthetic experience. We can see that Ganzeld by James Turell is more immersive than Documenta by Boltanski, but other criteria must be taken into account to finally justify our preference for one or the other artwork.

James Turrell, Ganzfeld, 2005, Paris.
Christian Boltanski, Monumenta, 2010, Paris.

To sum up my approach, the main question I will address is: on what criteria can we judge artworks of contemporary art before which the general public is often perplexed and confused? I will revisit Kantian and Humean thought on the judgment of taste to trace the divergence between the appreciation of fine art and contemporary art. In addition, my research will focus on the analytical aesthetics of Sibley to grasp the non-aesthetic dimensions on which we can make our aesthetic judgment. To establish the model of an aesthetic rationalization, I will reconstruct the notion of Michaud’s aesthetic criteria, by developing autonomous values ​​in the diversity of the artworks. Focusing on the artworks of Francis Bacon, Marcel Duchamp and Antony Gormley, I will exercise the argumentative discourse on the discernment of an evaluative quality of contemporary works of art. My idea of ​​aesthetic rationalization must, thus, make a transition from the question “How do we judge art?” to the question “What criteria do we have for judging art?” “. In this regard, I do not claim to develop an exhaustive list of these criteria, but rather to set up a development scheme that will open up new perspectives in the evaluation of contemporary works of art.

References:

(1) Paul McCarthy, Tree, 2014, Paris, see http://www.lemonde.fr/culture/video/2014/10/24/plug-anal-chocolate-factory-mccarthy-explique-son-travail_4511703_3246.html.
(2) Rayner ROCHLITZ, Subversion et subvention, op. cit., 61.
(3) Marc JIMENEZ, La Querelle de l’art contemporain, op. cit., p. 226.
(4) Nelson GOODMAN, “Quand y a t’il art?”
(5) Rainer ROCHLITZ, Subversion et subvention, op. cit., p. 60.
(6) Ibid. p.92.
(7) Gérard GENETTE, L’oeuvre de l’art, op. cit., p. 238.
(8) Yves MICHAUD, Critères esthétique et jugement de goût, op. cit., p. 73.
(9) Ibid. p.18.
(10) Rainer ROCHLITZ, Subversion et subvention, op. cit., p. 164-172.
(11) Rainer ROCHLITZ, Subversion et subvention, op. cit., p. 167.
(12) Ibid. p.171.
(13) Marc JIMENEZ, La Querelle de l’art contemporain, op. cit., p. 252.
(14) See the interview with Paul McCarthy on http://www.lemonde.fr/culture/video/2014/10/24/plug-anal-chocolate-factory-mccarthy-explique-son-travail_4511703_3246.html.