One of the ancient problems of metaphysics is about whether universals exist. Universal is what particular things have in common, namely characteristics or qualities. For instance, two pieces of chalk have in common a quality of color, namely “whiteness”.

There are many philosophical positions regarding universals. The main contemporary ones are:

  • Realism which postulates that universals exist independently of human conceiver. Some examples of universals: north, triangle, whiteness.
  • Nominalism which is the position that there are only individuals or particulars. There is no whiteness. There is an object that is white. All of these classes, functions, numbers don’t exist.
  • Conceptualism (Intuitionism) which states that universals exist only as constructs of a human conceiver.
  • Positivism that holds that the question about universals is meaningless.

Realism by Russel

Russel defends Plato’s realism about universals. According to Plato, we are in the cave in which we see shadows of images of the real world on the wall. To see the real world of ideas (universals) clearly, we have to get outside of this cave, but we cannot. The allegory is that it’s up to the philosopher to bring us to the light of the real world. Russell wants to prove that there must be universal relations that are not in space or in time. They are different from physical objects. For instance, justice is not a particular thing. It is an idea or the form of an idea. It is not in a world of sense. It’s immutable and indestructive. It’s supra. It subsists. For instance, this is a white piece of chalk. That is a white piece of chalk. This piece of chalk resembles that white piece of chalk in the sense they are both white pieces of chalk. In what respect they are both white? There is “whiteness”. Whiteness is innate, it is not mental. Universals in themselves are not thoughts. Nominalism, claiming that universals don’t subsist independently, is mistaken.

Nominalism by Quine

Quine defends nominalism, anti-realist view about universals. Universal “whiteness” does not exist. The piece of chalk is a particular that has the property being white.

One of the problems of nominalism is that the use of names and predicates commits us to such entities and universals. When we say that Pegasus does not exist, we name “Pegasus”. There is some kind of objective reference. If we name it, then it should exist. It sounds like we imply its existence and then we contradict ourselves. To avoid this contradiction, Quine wants to use definite descriptions. “Pegasus does not exist” means “It is not the case that there is at least one X that has such properties” or “There is no entity in the world that fits this description”. Similarly, when we say there is a white dog, it means that there is at least one X (dog) that X is white and X is dog. We do not say that whiteness or doginess exist. So the use of predicates (e.g. white) does not commit us to universals. Only quantifier (e.g. one, two, all) commits to the ontology. Therefore, there is not a universal.

Quine also wants to reject Fregam senses or meanings. According to Fregam, meaning is not the same as the name of reference. Hence, there is some third world of meanings and senses. For instance, when we say “morning star”, we name the same thing. Yet, we mean something different. Therefore, the meaning of a morning star exists in a third world. Quine argues that we can talk about the meaning of a whole sentence, but it does not mean that predicates and universals exist.

Quine is a scientific realist. He argues that in order to be something, it has to have some quality. For instance, bicycle has 2 wheels – this is the value of a bound variable. The property (2 wheels) makes it what it is. What exists is the object of the quantifier. We are positing these objects over there. It is not a bicycle I am seeing, it is just my input of sense data. I am suggesting that there is a bicycle over there, but I can be mistaken. When I posit empirical object, it goes beyond my sense data.

Finally, our acceptance of an ontology is similar in principle to our acceptance of a scientific theory. We adopt the simplest conceptual scheme into which the disordered fragments of new experience can be fitted and arranged.

Positivism by Carnap

Carnap holds that the debate about universals is meaningless. To be meaningful, the question must be “analytic a priori” or “synthetic a posteriori and verifiable”. A proposition is verifiable iff there is a way to confirm or disconfirm it empirically. The question about universals is not verifiable.

Carnap wants to distinguish two kinds of questions of existence: internal questions and external questions. Internal questions are questions of the existence of certain entities of the new kind within framework. External questions are questions concerning the existence or reality of the system of entities as a whole. For instance, “5” is a natural number” is a kind of internal question because it belongs to the linguistic framework. On the other hand, “5 exists” is a kind of external question. It should be rejected since it is meaningless. To be real in a scientific sense is to be an element of the system (linguistic framework). Realism and nominalism are meaningless, for they postulate metaphysical questions. Accordingly, their answers are also meaningless.

Conclusion

Russel seems to be more convincing about the existence of universals. His claim that we should not ignore universal relations is reasonable. Taking into account only qualities, Russel’s opponents are mainly focused on the rejection of abstract ideas. If they were asked to define, let us say, a thing that is triangle, they would say that anything is a triangle if it has the right sort of resemblance to their deduced particular as an image in mind. Yet, the resemblance required will have to be a universal since it must hold between many pairs of particular white things. It is useless to say that there is a different resemblance for each pair, for then we are forced to admit that these resemblances resemble each other. The relation of resemblance, therefore, must be a universal.

Bibliography:

  • Carnap, R. Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology, in Reality in Focus: contemporary readings on metaphysics / edited by Paul K. Moser, Prentice-Hall, Inc, 1990
  • Russel, Bertrand, A world of Individuals, in Reality in Focus: contemporary readings on metaphysics / edited by Paul K. Moser, Prentice-Hall, Inc, 1990
  • Quine, W.V. On What There is, in Reality in Focus: contemporary readings on metaphysics / edited by Paul K. Moser, Prentice-Hall, Inc, 1990