Realism is being understood as the view that regardless of how we think of things they are what they are. Metaphysical realism is the view that there is a mind-independent reality. Contrary to realism, anti-realism postulates that the physical world does not exist outside the mind. There is no such thing as mind-independent reality or we would not have access to it even if it exists. Anit-realism is associated with coherence theory of truth and pragmatist theory of truth, while realism is closely associated with the correspondence theory of truth.

Correspondence theory of truth

a statement is true iff it agrees with facts of experience.

In other words, what makes our statements true of false is the way things are, not the reasons, evidence, or justification we have for it. For instance, snow is white iff snow is white. It depends on the world, not on human capacity. Truth of correspondence theory is entirely independent on human capacity.

(1) One of the objections to the correspondence theory of truth is that it is impossible to get outside of our conceptual framework and compare sentences with reality. Suppose John says “The wall is white.” John has a certain set of beliefs, that is he is in his conceptual framework. So, truth is relative to this conceptual framework. John has to get out of this framework to compare sentences with reality, but it is impossible to do. He can’t do that. According to Quine, there are too many manuals you can pick up. Because of the indeterminacy of translation there are indefinitely many versions of what it is I am saying about an object in any assertion I make.

In response to this objection, Alston defends that even if the reference is incomprehensible or inconceivable, it is not really an objection to realism. In the language game (religious game, scientific game), the meanings of propositions have to do with mode or conditions of verification. If mode is different, the truth is relative to particular language game. There is no way to step out of the conceptual scheme. It leaves completely open the question of whether, in saying what I say, I am claiming to refer to something that exists independent of our discourse, and whether this is an intelligible or reasonable claim to make. What we assert by language is not always what it is. It is a miserable truism.

(2) Another objection to correspondence theory of truth is construed in the following way. If we are to have any reason for supposing that any of our statements are realistically true, there must be some points at which we have direct access to the way things are in themselves. So, there must be some given or facts. However, there are no such things as facts because the world does not come pre-sorted. There is something wrong with this theory. Quine confirms that there is no such thing as given. Looking at the web of beliefs, we can state that meaning is holistic (entire) and non-atomic. A given is supposed to be observational by virtue of observational sentences (O.S.).

So, there are no analytic sentences (necessarily true) at the core and at the observational level. Hence, there is no such thing as given and reality is conditioned by our conceptual scheme. The truth should be justified.

According to Alston, it is false. There is a connection between justification and truth.

(P) The wall is white.

S knows that P:

  • P is true,
  • S knows that P
  • S is justified in believing that P.

So, justification is not unconnected with the truth in the epistemic sense. Why would we care about justification at all?

Coherence theory of truth

A statement is true iff it is logically consistent with some preferred set of sentences.

So, it is up to us, not up to the world. The truth of a statement is partly dependent on human capacity.

One of the objections to coherence theory of truth is that even if a statement is logically consistent with some preferred set, the set may have nothing to do with the real world. Thus, we have a lift-off problem.

Pragmatist theory of truth

A statement is true iff it is useful, given our goal.

So, it is up to us whether we decide that a certain proposition is useful. Truth = usefulness, utility. Nevertheless, one can still ask are these statements true? The fact that the statement is useful, still leaves the question. It may be useful but false.

Pierce’s pragmastist theory of truth

The truth of a statement S is such that S is a survivor at the ideal limit of the scientific inquiry.

e.g. Lead melts at 327F means “The sentence ‘Lead melts at 327F’ will (would) be included in the final scientific theory.

Objection: it is included in the final sentence because it is true (Alston).

Lewis’ verificationism

The container is made of glass means:

(1) If I were to seem to dash this container to the floor, I would seem to see the container shattering.
(2) If I were to seem to thump this container with my finger, I would hear a certain kind of ringing sound.

Objection: you can’t verify the truth of statement by defining the conditions and verification. So, you can’t get rid of realism. The state of the content is linked to reference, to conditions that statement is true (Alston).

Putnam’s version of the pragmatist theory of truth

A statement is true iff it is rationally acceptable under ideal epistemic conditions.

We determine what are those conditions. So, the truth is determined by us. The metaphysical structure in the world (mind-independent reality) is a construction by humans. It is a product of our conceptual framework.

The materialists often takes causal relations as an example of built-in structure. In other words, causal power is built into nature. For instance, certain objects have causal powers that explain something given background conditions. E.g. micro-structure. In response to materialists, Putnam rejects that this causal power is built into nature. We have some causal explanation, but it depends on relevance, background conditions. We build this structure into nature. What we see at the micro-structure of sugar, it is not something intrinsic to the sugar. If it was built into nature, then the world would look like mind, which contradicts to materialism.

Bibliography:

  • Alston, William P., Yes, Virginia, There is a Real World in Reality in Focus: contemporary readings on metaphysics / edited by Paul K. Moser, Prentice-Hall, Inc, 1990
  • Putnam, Hilary, Why There Isn’t a Ready-Made World in Reality in Focus: contemporary readings on metaphysics / edited by Paul K. Moser, Prentice-Hall, Inc, 1990