For Locke, the idea of liberty arises from the power of the mind over the actions of the man.

Freedom consists in our being able to act or not act, according as we shall choose or will.

Locke gives an example of a man who is carried and locked into a room while asleep. When waking up, he finds himself in a desirable company with another person. He is glad to speak with that person and prefers his stay to going away. Despite his willing to stay, it is evident he is not at liberty not to stay. In other words, he does not have freedom to be gone. By this example, Locke tries to emphasize that liberty is not an idea belonging to volition, but to the person having the power of doing, or abstaining to do an action, according as the mind shall choose. So, that man locked in a room has the power of staying but not staying in the room. His power is limited to doing action, while he cannot abstain to do it. If he was not locked, he would have the power not to stay and, thus, be free.

Suppose that willing is an action and liberty depends on this act of volition. In such a case, a man could not be free in respect of that act of willing since he could not avoid willing the existence or not existence of that action. This is the reason why liberty cannot depend on act of willing since a man is not at liberty to will or not to will. We cannot say that a man is at liberty whether he will determine himself to walk, or give off walking. His liberty is defined after his preference of one or the other of actions, walking or not walking.

Locke points out that freedom consists in the dependence of the existence or not existence of any action, upon our volition of it, and not in the dependence of any action or its contrary. A man standing on a cliff is at liberty to leap twenty yards downwards into the sea or not. Saying that his liberty consists in the dependence of the existence or not existence of any action does not mean that he should have the power to do the contrary action, meaning to leap twenty yards upwards. Similarly, a prisoner in a room twenty feet square, being at the north side of this chamber can walk or not walk twenty feet southward. Thus, he is at liberty to do or refrain walking twenty feed southward. At the same time, he is not at liberty to do the contrary, that is walking twenty feed northward.

Locke adds that, when defining liberty, will and desire must not be confounded. We choose to act or not, upon our volition of it. This act of will is nothing but a particular determination of the mind, which gives rise or stop to any action. So, the will always leads to the action chosen. Desire, on the other hand, may have quite contrary tendency in relation to the will. In the very same action, the will and desire may run counter. For instance, a friend of yours asks you to talk to a person which you do not like. You wish to fulfil a request of your friend and, as a result, you talk to that person. However, you wish you may not talk to him. In this case, the act of the will which was caused by the request of the friend of yours is contrary to your desire that tends another way.

 In conclusion, Locke clarifies that the will is determined by uneasiness. When we will something, this volition makes us uneasy in the want of it. In other words, there is an uneasiness of the mind for want of some absent good. However, this is not the greatest positive good that determines the will. We may try to convince a poor man that rich life is better than the poor one, but he may ignore this message. As long as he is content with the way he lives, his volition will never be determined to any action that shall bring him out of the poor life. As soon as he finds uneasiness in his life, his will shall bring him into action.

Bibliography:

  • Locke, John, Essay Concerning Human Understanding in Modern Philosophy, an anthology of primary sources, second edition, edited by Roger Ariew and Eric Watkins, Hackett Publishing Company, Inc. 2009