Goldman is an externalist and a foundationalist who thinks that it is possible to have justified belief even if there is not reason to believe that it is true. If it is a matter of fact that our visual perception is reliable, then our beliefs might be justified. Visual perception is reliable when conditions are typically set. We assume in ordinary standards that our visual perception works well.

If S’s belief in P at t results from a reliable cognitive process, and there is no reliable or conditionally reliable process available to S which, had it been used by S in addition to the process actually used, would have resulted in S’s not believing P at t, then S’s belif in P at t is justified.

Goldman uses non-epistemic terms in the explanation of his account, because epistemic, normative terms do not clarify the nature of our justification. He surveys four possible approaches to justified belief with normative terms and claims all of them fail.

(1) If S believes P at t, and P is indubitable for S (at t), then S’s belief in P at t is justified. It can be understood in at least two ways:

  • S has no grounds for doubting P (“ground” is an epistemic term)
  • S is psychologically incapable of doubting p (a religious fanatic may be psychologically incapable of doubting P of his faith).

The first one is not acceptable because there is an epistemic term. If we substitute “ground” for “indubitable” it won’t help. “Psychologically incapable of doubting p” is admissible, but fails because it can relate to faith. So, they are both inadmissible and (1) fails.

(2) If S believes P at t and P is self-evident, then S’s belief in p at t is justified. Again, “self-evident” is a normative term. In other cases, self-evident would mean “It is impossible to understand P without believing it” (humanly impossible). That is also unacceptable principle. If we interpret “self-evident” as logically impossible, then it’s not true.

∼ ( P→Q )
∴ ∼ P ∧ Q
∼ P

I am unable to belief in P. The fact that I am unable to belief P, does not make the belief in P justified.

(3) If P is a self-presenting proposition, and P is true for S at t, and S believes P at t, then S’s belief in p at t is justified.

“Self-presenting” fails because it is an epistemic term. S’s belief that he is in a brain-state B is not justified. The mere fact that I am dreaming would not justify the belief.

(4) If P is an incorrigible proposition, and S believes p at t, then S’s belief in p at t is justified.

If even P is logically incorrigible, it is not necessarily that S’s belief is justified.

Critique of Goldman’s account of justification

Bonjour, as one of the opponents to the externalist view, argues that the reliable process is not enough to produce a justified belief. He cites the case where a cognizer, named Samantha, has the power of clairvoyance. She believes appealing to her extracensory perception that the President is in New York City, even though everybody talks that he is in Washington. In fact, the President is in New York City and Samantha’s clairvoyance satisfied conditions of the reliable process. However, Bonjour argues that she is irrational in accepting the belief, because she had good reason to think that the President is in Washington, but not in New York City. Hence, her belief can not be epistemically justified. Goldman could simply manage this critique by stating that the belief in P is justified if it was reliably formed and there were no other reliable processes available, which could result in not believing P. In this case, Bonjour would say that Samantha has an alternative reliable process – news reports, press releases, live television pictures – that refutes her original belief. Thus, the externalist would agree that Samantha’s belief is not justified.

Another objection to Goldman’s account may concern particular situations when the cognizer perceives an object, which in fact does not look like the cognizer sees it. For instance, a blue wall may appear whity to me, because an evil scientist directed a special lighting at it. Goldman would answer that my visual experience was produced in an unreliable way, even though I considered my perception reliable at that moment. I could find out that the wall is blue by looking at if from different angles or by using special glasses.

This brings us one more objection, which contends that there is no way to establish what reliable process is used or which one is more reliable. This claim is reasonable, but does not provide any foundation for a serious objection, since a selection of the reliable process is the job of not philosophers, but scientists or psychologists.

Regardless its weaknesses, Goldmans’s account of justified belief is more epistemologically adequate than a Bonjour’s coherence theory of epistemic knowledge. Goldman’s theory is more compatible with our everyday reasoning, which involves often beliefs not based on good reasons.

Bibliography:

  • Goldman, Alvin, “What Is Justified Belief?” in G. Pappas, ed. Justification and Knowledge (Dordrecht: D. Reidel), 1-23, 1979
  • BonJour, Laurence, The Structure of Empirical Knowledge, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1985