“Do we have free will?” is one of the principal metaphysical questions which philosophers are focused on. Let’s consider what we mean by free will. One can say that free will iff it is a voluntary act. In other words, we chose to do it. However, there are voluntary acts but they are not free, since the person could be compelled to do the act. Others can define free acts as uncompelled acts. But uncompelled acts can also be not free because our behavior is extensively controlled by unconscious forces. Even if we think we are free, we are not free. Fatalism and determinism threats to the possibility of free will.

Fatalism
Regardless of what antecedent events and circumstances obtain, some event E was bound to happen. For instance, no matter how much time I will spend on the exam, I am going to fail. So, all events are fated, predetermined. Causality is irrelevant.

Determinism
It postulates that every event is causally determined by preceding events and circumstances, to happen just as it does happen. That is: for any event E, E is the result of a set of sufficient preconditions. Given C, E had to occur. For instance, water freezes at -100 º C , nothing else would have happened. There is no predetermination. Causality is all that matters.

Regarding to determinism, we can distinguish between hard determinism, soft determinism and indeterminism.

Indeterminism or Liberterianism
Determinism is false with respect to human choice, and we have categorical free will. Categorical free will means that X could have done otherwise because X could have chosen otherwise. It implies freedom from determinism.

Soft Determinism
Determinism is true with respect to human choice, and we have hypothetical free will. X could have done otherwise if genetic history, character or other preconditions were different. Hypothetical free will implies freedom from constraint. As long as we are not physically constrained and we are doing what we want to do, we are free.

For hard determinists, soft determinism is false because it is a description of a puppet. That is a wrong sense of free will. As long as my volition is caused by antecedent conditions, I actually could not do it otherwise. If determinism is true, the agency of will does not make sense.

Hard Determinism
Determinism is true with respect to human choice and we have no categorical free will.

Hospers’ argument for hard determinism

  1. An occurrence over which we had no control in some things, we cannot be held responsible for.
  2. Events E, occurring during our babyhood, were events over which we had no control.
  3. Therefore, events E were events which we cannot be held responsible for.
  4. But if there is something we cannot be held responsible for, neither can we be held responsible for something that inevitably results from it.
  5. Events E have, as inevitable consequences, Neurosis N, which in turn has inevitable consequence behavior B.
  6. Since Neurosis N is the inevitable consequence of Events E and B is the inevitable consequence of N, behavior B is the inevitable consequence of Events E.
  7. Hence, not being responsible for E, we cannot be responsible for B.

If determinism is true, then we do not have free will. There is no categorical free will.

Taylor’s Indeterminism

Richard Taylor argues that hard and soft determinism are false. The world seems determined, but it is not with respect to human choice. If determinism were true, then there would not be such thing as free will. Consequently, there would not be moral responsibility. We could not blame or praise people if determinism were true. According to Taylor, there are two facts that give us a reason to think that determinism is false. The first one is deliberation. I can deliberate about my own behavior and about my future. Secondly, I can only deliberate when I believe that it’s up to me. For instance, it’s up to me to move the finger to the left or to the right. If I moved it to the left, I could move it otherwise at the moment of decision. So, Taylor defends indeterminism and categorical free will.

Hard determinists would say that my deliberation is a part of the causal structure. Moving finger to the left was necessitated given all the antecedent conditions. I don’t have a genuine choice. For hard determinists, there is not such thing as moral responsibility.

Taylor defends indeterminism, but he rejects simple indeterminism in favor of his sophisticated theory of agency. In the case of simple indeterminism, my acts are uncaused, or they are caused by my volition that is uncaused. It follows that I do not have control. Simple indeterminism does not capture the data, the volition, the agency. Taylor maintains that we are self determining. The idea is that it’s true that genetic heritage, experience and other external factors affect our behavior. Nevertheless, despite the antecedent causal conditions, sometimes we initiate behaviors, causes. It’s me who initiates it, but not volition inside me. Humans have that capacity that is incompatible with laws of nature. An agent is a substance, not an event.

Hard determinists would say that we have these capacities to determine, but our decisions are predetermined. The idea that we make choices is an illusion. My reasoning is just a part of the causal chain of events.

Conclusion

Hard determinists seem hard to beat. Their arguments are strong and universal in a sense that any reasoning or decision can be converted into the result of the causal chain of preconditions. However, to show that determinism is really true, someone should be able to calculate any future event or action given antecedent conditions. Although we are limited in our mathematical capacities, probably it is a matter of time due to IT technologies and artificial intelligence. Likewise, we still cannot prove indeterminism since its agency of will is incompatible with the modern scientific picture of the world. We are still confused about free will and the process of deliberation.

Bibliography:

  • John Hospers, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol. 10, no. 3, March 1950.
  • Richard Taylor, Metaphysics, 4th ed., Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1992, p. 38