Clarke’s naturalized epistemology
Unlike Quine, Murray Clarke is defending a weak replacement thesis of naturalized epistemology. Clarke argues that accurate indexical representations (a belief about the here and now which moves us to action) have been crucial for the survival and reproduction of homo sapiens. He suggests that reliable processes have been “selected for” because of their indirect, […]
Goldman’s justified belief
Goldman is an externalist and a foundationalist who thinks that it is possible to have justified belief even if there is not reason to believe that it is true. If it is a matter of fact that our visual perception is reliable, then our beliefs might be justified. Visual perception is reliable when conditions are […]
Goldman and Dretske on knowledge
Alvin Goldman makes another hypothesis to the traditional account of knowledge for the fact that Smith cannot be said to know P. What makes P true is the fact that Brown is in Barcelona, but this fact has nothing to do with Smith’s believing P. That is, there is no causal connection between the fact […]