Chisholm on knowledge as self-justified beliefs
According to the regress argument, any proposition requires a justification. However, any justification itself requires support. This means that any proposition whatsoever can be infinitely questioned. N (Regress) → C → B → A Chisholm, as an internalist and a foundationalist, claims that there are some foundational propositions that are self-justified. C (Foundation) → B […]
Nozick’s tracking account of knowledge
Robert Nozick states that in order to know we need to satisfy the following four conditions: S knows that p iff p is true, S believes that p, If it weren’t that case that p, then S wouldn’t believe that p, If it were the case that p then S would believe that p. This […]
Harman’s account of knowledge
The Gettier problem has shown that knowledge is not simply justified true belief. This leads to the following principle P: reasoning that essentially involves false conclusions, intermediate or final, cannot give knowledge. So, we cannot argue from the false intermediate conclusion. Undermining evidence Gilbert Harman builds into this principle a new condition Q: one may […]
Goldman and Dretske on knowledge
Alvin Goldman makes another hypothesis to the traditional account of knowledge for the fact that Smith cannot be said to know P. What makes P true is the fact that Brown is in Barcelona, but this fact has nothing to do with Smith’s believing P. That is, there is no causal connection between the fact […]
Gettier’s objection to traditional account of knowledge
The traditional account of knowledge is as follows: P is true (truth) S believes that P (belief) S is justified in believing that P (justification) For instance, we can say that I know that it snowed if and only if: It really snowed, and I believe that it snowed, and I am justified in believing […]