Berkeley and Locke on Abstract Ideas
The main argument that Berkeley discloses in the introduction of a “Treatise” is that abstractionism is illusionary and inaccessible. In this context, Berkeley is criticizing Locke for his attempt to frame abstract notions that lead us to uncertainty and doubtfulness. Locke introduces abstraction as one of the operations of mind, along with compounding, comparing, memory […]
Clarke’s naturalized epistemology
Unlike Quine, Murray Clarke is defending a weak replacement thesis of naturalized epistemology. Clarke argues that accurate indexical representations (a belief about the here and now which moves us to action) have been crucial for the survival and reproduction of homo sapiens. He suggests that reliable processes have been “selected for” because of their indirect, […]
Carnap on meaning and meaningfulness
Carnap wants to diminish bad metaphysics influence, so he rejects metaphysical terms which are meaningless and non-verifiable. Metaphysical beliefs are derived neither by logic nor by empirical evidences: Aesthetics – this painting is better than.. Ethics – X ought to do Y, Religion – God exists. These propositions are meaningless as they are non-verifiable. According […]
Quine on naturalized epistemology
Quine argues that the position of the dominant epistemology has failed and we need to reconstruct the traditional view in another way. We should replace epistemology with psychology, because epistemology is asking wrong questions. Instead of “How ought we to arrive at our beliefs?”, the main question should be “How do we arrive at our […]
Goldman’s justified belief
Goldman is an externalist and a foundationalist who thinks that it is possible to have justified belief even if there is not reason to believe that it is true. If it is a matter of fact that our visual perception is reliable, then our beliefs might be justified. Visual perception is reliable when conditions are […]
BonJour on coherentism
BonJour argues that to have justified belief you need to have good reasons that your belief is true. Otherwise, you are epistemically irresponsible. BonJour rejects basic account of strong foundationalism, which claims that there are self-justified beliefs that do not depend on other beliefs. For instance, I possess the belief that the wall is white. […]
Chisholm on knowledge as self-justified beliefs
According to the regress argument, any proposition requires a justification. However, any justification itself requires support. This means that any proposition whatsoever can be infinitely questioned. N (Regress) → C → B → A Chisholm, as an internalist and a foundationalist, claims that there are some foundational propositions that are self-justified. C (Foundation) → B […]
Nozick’s tracking account of knowledge
Robert Nozick states that in order to know we need to satisfy the following four conditions: S knows that p iff p is true, S believes that p, If it weren’t that case that p, then S wouldn’t believe that p, If it were the case that p then S would believe that p. This […]
Harman’s account of knowledge
The Gettier problem has shown that knowledge is not simply justified true belief. This leads to the following principle P: reasoning that essentially involves false conclusions, intermediate or final, cannot give knowledge. So, we cannot argue from the false intermediate conclusion. Undermining evidence Gilbert Harman builds into this principle a new condition Q: one may […]
Goldman and Dretske on knowledge
Alvin Goldman makes another hypothesis to the traditional account of knowledge for the fact that Smith cannot be said to know P. What makes P true is the fact that Brown is in Barcelona, but this fact has nothing to do with Smith’s believing P. That is, there is no causal connection between the fact […]