Leibniz, unlike other rationalists before him, exemplified a more comprehensive universe that was chosen by God as the best of all possible worlds. This perfect world is characterized by an infinite number of simple substances “monads” which are non-spatial and non-temporal entities. In this paper, I shall try to break into the Leibniz’s system to cast doubt upon his views about God’s existence, free will, the problem of evil and the notion of individual.

          To start I will focus briefly on a cosmological argument that Leibniz uses to argue for the existence of God. In his work Monadology[i], Leibniz claims that everything that exists has a sufficient reason for its being and not otherwise. To avoid an infinite regress of this series of contingencies, there must exist some ultimate substance for all this diversity, and “…this is what we call God” (Monadology, 278). One of the main objections to this argument is construed by Bertrand Russel[ii] who denies that the universe needs an explanation. Just as the human race does not have a mother, the “world is simply there and is unexplicable”. (Russel, 409-410). Russel insists that even though scientists look for causes, they do not necessarily assume that everything has a cause. In support of his claim, Russel gives us an example of individual quantum transitions in atoms that, according to physicists, have no causal explanation. David Hume[iii] makes a similar attack on the cosmological argument by postulating the principle of an explanation of the whole in terms of its parts. Hume holds that if a cause of every individual in a collection of the whole is explained, then it is unreasonable to ask what is the cause of the whole. 

          Another central concern relates to the perfection of the Leibniz’s world that generates a series of problems. First, Leibniz claims that, since God is perfect, he chose the world with most perfection among an infinity of possible worlds. From this, it follows that whatever God creates, it corresponds to only one notion of perfection. So, if God’s free will is bound by what is the most good, then the reality is determined. Consequently, God has not free will at all. George Gale, in his work On What God Chose: Perfection and God’s Freedom[iv], explains that God could be free only if he had chosen not a world, but rather a criterion of perfection. Put it differently, God chose a mathematico/physical notion of perfection, computed the perfection-ratio for each world, and then created the most perfect world according to the chosen criterion. There seems to be also a problem in saving free will of individuals in the Leibniz’s doctrine. To avoid fatalism[v], in which every other fact about the universe could be rationally deducible from the individual concept, Leibniz shows that human will is hypothetically free. Since God chose the world of an infinite array of possible worlds, individuals could have done otherwise if a different world had chosen. Nevertheless, Leibniz presupposes that human actions are resulting from antecedent conditions, that is human choice is determined. One of the defenders of libertarianism, Richard Taylor[vi] claims that if determinism is true, then there is no such thing as free will and responsibility. The theory of soft determinism holds that the inner states that cause the body to behave must arise from antecedent circumstances. For instance, even if my body is unimpeded and unconstrained, my volition could be caused by an infinite chain of causes and effects. In this case, I can not be blamed or praised with respect to my choice, which is incompatible with Christian theology.

          The further difficulty I want to address is the problem of evil that Leibniz attempts to solve in his theodicy[vii]. Critiques of Leibniz points out that an amount of pain in this world does not justify belief that God has created the best of all possible worlds. Leibniz argues that suffering is good because it is a part of the infinite goodness of God. Evil is just the product of our limited intelligence, which fails to grasp the true character of God’s creative intentions. We call things evil when they are viewed in isolation, but they might be good in relation to other events and processes. Moreover, Leibniz insists that earthly human happiness can not be considered the standard by which the goodness of worlds is to be judged. As Gale notes, perfection for Leibniz means a “unique mathematical-physical property of the universe” (Gale, 85). Since god is a mathematician, then he has created the world that is perfect mathematically. Put it simply, God computed the perfection-ratio for each world and chose the world where the sum of necessary evil is a minimum. Consequently, it becomes more difficult to defend the claim that this world is not the best of all possible worlds, since we are unable to know how the consequences of changing events would affect the true overall goodness of the world. However, critiques[viii] maintain that calling evil an illusion “…does not eliminate the realm of appearance of the tragedies, the sufferings, and the iniquities which men so frequently endure” (Nagel, 401). If Leibniz is right, then we can be indifferent to human miseries and agonies, since the entire human suffering leads to goodness in proper perspective. Moreover, if we turn the argument around, what we judge to be a good might be an evil in relation to the entire scheme of things. Hence, moral good would be contingent, which contradicts to metaphysical necessity of the best of all possible worlds.

          The final problem I shall discuss is the concept of individuation that Leibniz attempts to fit into his world that exhibits a ratio of the richest variety of effects compared to the simplest Laws of Nature. For Leibniz, an infinite number of simple substances, or “monads”, which are causally and perceptually isolated from one another, correlates the maximal possible complexity with the maximal possible order. So, these mind-like entities, which have neither parts, nor “…extension, no shape, no divisibility…”, occupy as basic individuals without reference to bodies (Monadology, 275). According to Leibniz, what makes monads different is that each of them represents the entire universe from its own point of view. In his book Persons[ix], P.F. Strawson argues that Leibniz fails to secure the uniqueness of the monad in the world where material bodies are not basic to particular-identification. Making an analogy between monads and minds or consciousness, Strawson points out “…that different subjects of states of consciousness, different persons, might be in qualitatively indistinguishable states of consciousness” (Strawson, 125). We can give up an idea of monads as non-particulars, but then monads would be particulars only by the grace of God. In this case, we preserve the character of the ontology of monads, but destroy the logical integrity of the system. Since God is absolutely perfect and is the cause of the best, he probably would not duplicate monad in a perfect order. Moreover, without relying on a logical principle, Leibniz would ascribe too much to God as the supreme source of diversity. Strawson then construes alternative view in which monads acquire the status of not particulars, but of types of concepts. In this case, the idea of individuation of monads in a non-spatial and non-temporal world without grace of God seems intelligible. Given that sketch of the Leibnizian system, the set of monads would be identical with the set of concepts. Yet, even this interpretation does not guarantee that an indefinite number of particular consciousnesses would not enjoy the same set of states. Strawson concludes that monads can not be the primary concept of a person, since all of them lack corporeal attributes. We should have material bodies in the world to be able to construe the notion of a person.  

In conclusion, Leibniz, who was the last of the great rationalists, elegantly enriched the movement with his complex and mature rationalism. However, Leibniz never solved the problem of evil, individuation nor overcame difficulties with free will.

References:

[i] G.W.Leibniz, The principle of Philosophy, or the Monadology (1714) in Modern Philosophy edited by Roger Ariew and Eric Watkins, 2009.

[ii] Bertrand Russell and F.C. Copleston, The Existence of God – A Debate, inMurray Clarke Reality in Focus (OPBK), BookStore Concordia University. 

[iii] Bruce Reichenbach, Cosmological Argument, Stanford Encyclopedia, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/cosmological-argument/, 2012

[iv] George Gale, On What God Chose: Perfection and God’s Freedom, Studia Leibnitiana, Bd. 8, H. 1 (1976), pp. 69-87

[v] Thomas M. Lennon, Continental Rationalism, Encyclopedia of Stanford, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/continental-rationalism/#Leibniz   2012

[vi] Richard Taylor, Metaphysics, 2/E, 1974, pp.39-47, Englewood Cliffs, in Murray Clarke, Reality in Focus, pp. 267-281. Concordia BookStore.

[vii] Michael Murray, Leibniz On The Problem Of Evil, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/leibniz-evil/#Var, 2005

[viii] Ernest Nagel, A Defense of Atheism, in Murray Clarke Reality in Focus (OPBK), BookStore Concordia University, pp 395-404

[ix] P.F. Strawson, Individuals, Routledge, London and New York, 1959, pp. 117-134